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ansaldo, 1918-1940
Abstract: Utilizing archival materials, this paper examines the case
of the Genoa-based firm, Ansaldo, which, by the early decades of
the 20th century, had emerged as a major force in the inter-related
fields of engineering, shipbuilding, and metal and steel manufacture
in Italy. Following financial problems immediately after World War I
and during the 1920s, the company was subsequently taken under the
umbrella of the Italian State’s financial holding unit, the Institute for
Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), in the 1930s. Utilizing Lewin’s theory
of change as a framework for investigating change in management
accounting, the paper examines the internal and external factors
influencing the development of cost/management accounting at the
company. These are also examined against the background of the development of scientific management, both in Italy and elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION
	It has recently been stated that management accounting is
“not simply a technical activity but a set of practices that produce and reproduce not just organizational life but also social
and economic life at a more macro level.” Thus, it is appropriate to “fully understand management accounting,” that one
should “examine its social, economic and political context and
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Mr. Alessandro Lombardo, director of Archivio Storico Ansaldo, for his collaboration and kindness,
Dick Fleischman, and the two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier
versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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recognize the role of power and conflict” [Cooper and Hopper,
2007, p. 208]. This is not to deny the need to examine events and
factors at play within an individual context, but rather to emphasize that individual organizations do not exist in a vacuum,
and that changes in accounting for managerial purposes will be
influenced by factors both internal and external to the organization. This is particularly the case in relation to the focus of this
study, the Italian engineering conglomerate Ansaldo during the
period between the two world wars.
	The interwar years were a period when scientific management began to come of age, not only in America but also in Europe. While there has been much research on the development
of scientific management in different countries [Nelson, 1980,
1992; Moutet, 1992], the relationship between the growth of a
scientific approach to management and the development of cost
and management accounting is little understood. In the American context, Chandler [1977, 1990] has pointed to the growth
of large, multidivisional M-form corporations between the wars
with the development of managerial hierarchies and accounting
techniques such as standard costing and budgeting. While Chandler has suggested that it was the growth of the former which
gave rise to the latter, Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 21] argue
that the link was possibly the other way around, that the development of these accounting techniques may have made possible
the growth of the large, M-form corporation. In work relating to
the Dowlais Iron Company in the mid-19th century, Boyns and
Edwards [1997] have suggested that the relationship between
the emergence of large firms and the development of cost/management accounting may have been the result of a symbiotic,
rather than a causal, relationship [see also, Alford, 1976].
A key element in the link between the growth of large businesses and developments in accounting in the early 20th century would therefore appear to be the development of a more
scientific approach to business management. Thus, accounting
historians have seen the early decades of the 20th century as a
crucial period for the advancement of cost accounting, not the
least due to the development of costing systems, the use of more
scientific methods of overhead allocation, and the introduction
of standard costing and budgeting [Solomons, 1952; Garner,
1954; Sowell, 1973; Chatfield, 1977; Epstein, 1978]. While budgeting and standard costing have been seen as an essentially
American phenomenon [Wells, 1978; Locke, 1984; Johnson and
Kaplan, 1987], the extent of their adoption in the U.S. is not
known with any degree of accuracy. Indeed, Fleischman [2000]
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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has questioned the extent of the adoption of scientific management by 1920, suggesting that even by 1940 its use in the U.S.
was limited.
	In Europe, research into the links between scientific management and the development of cost/management accounting has generated a somewhat confused picture. In Britain,
Loft [1986, 1990] has suggested that, in the 1920s, scientific
management reinforced the positive impact of World War I on
costing systems in British firms. However, the extent to which
scientific management was adopted in Britain in the interwar
period is still far from being known with any degree of accuracy,
though there was clearly an increasing emphasis on the use of
piecework systems and, from the mid-1920s, the Bedaux system
[Littler, 1982; Whitston, 1996, 1997; Smith and Boyns, 2005].
Nevertheless, examples do exist of companies adopting either
standard costing or budgeting [Boyns, 1998a, b] or both, sometimes in conjunction with the adoption of scientific management, such as the case of Hans Renold Ltd. [Boyns et al., 2000;
Boyns, 2003]. The adoption of standard costing and budgetary
control in the interwar years, however, was patchy with no clear
link emerging as to company size or ownership/governance
structure [see Quail, 1996, 1997; Boyns et al., 2000] or industrial sector. Boyns et al. [2004] found some limited evidence of
a growing interest in standard costing in the British chemical
industry before World War II, while in the iron and steel industry, Edwards et al. [2002, 2003] found a reluctance to adopt
such techniques among most, though not all, companies before
the 1950s and 1960s. In the engineering industry in the west of
Scotland, evidence suggests a similar reticence [see McKinstry,
1999; Fleming et al., 2000].
	In France, despite the interest shown in scientific management by vehicle manufacturers such as Louis Renault and
Marius Berliet, standard costing failed to be implemented in
any French business before World War II, though an increasing
number adopted budgeting from the mid-1920s [Berland, 1999;
Berland and Boyns, 2002]. According to Zimnovitch [1997], the
failure of standard costing to appear in France until the late
1950s and early 1960s, in part reflects the attitudes of French
accountants. Concerned as they were during the interwar years
to secure professional status for themselves, French accountants
favored the prix de revient method – full costing based on the
integration of costing within the financial accounting system
– thereby effectively establishing a barrier to the implementation of standard costing which was depicted as a “non-accountPublished by eGrove, 2008
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ing” method. It is possible that similar forces were at work in
Germany where Coenenberg and Schoenfeld [1990, p. 97] have
noted that, during the period 1900-1933, internal and external
accounting within firms was coming to be viewed as part of a
single, unified system.
Against this background, this paper attempts to throw light
on the link between the development of scientific management
and that of cost/management accounting in Italy between the
two world wars through an examination of the case of Ansaldo,
a major Italian engineering, shipbuilding, and metal manufacturing conglomerate. This company constitutes a particularly
interesting case study for many reasons. First, the company was
one of the most important firms on the Italian industrial scene
throughout the early decades of the 20th century as the largest
and most important business in Italy during World War I. Furthermore, at various times it was involved in relationships with
both European and non-European companies. Second, its story
is particularly representative of a particular way of doing business; namely, close links with government, a method which was
characteristic of the early stages of industrialization in Italy and
which impacted the development of management techniques
within the company. Third, Ansaldo belongs to a sector which,
in many countries, was in the forefront of the development of
cost accounting techniques and the use of cost information for
internal management purposes. Thus, a study of Ansaldo can
reveal not only what happened in a major Italian firm during the
early decades of the 20th century, it can possibly shed light more
generally on developments that can be contrasted with those in
other countries, both in Europe and in America.
	Our analysis of management accounting change at Ansaldo
is underpinned by the framework provided by Kurt Lewin’s
theory of change and will proceed as follows. In the next section,
we examine the issue of management accounting change generally, illustrating how Lewin’s theory provides a potential framework for historical research into this topic, enabling as it does
the inclusion of the role of human agents and contextualizing
influences in such change. This is followed by an examination
of the development of scientific management in Europe during

 In April 1930, the Mechanical Engineer, the official Journal of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, published a special edition in order to celebrate
the 50th anniversary of the Association. It published a Hall of Fame comprising 106 distinguished engineers, including F.W. Taylor, A. Carnegie, H. Bessemer,
etc., among whom only Pio Perrone, sometime chairman of Ansaldo, was Italian
[quoted in Fasce, 1993].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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the study period to provide the contextual background for our
case study of Ansaldo. The case study is split into two sub-sections, corresponding to the periods 1918-1933 and 1933-1940.
The year 1933 represented an important landmark for Ansaldo
as it came under the control of the State’s new industrial holding
arm, the IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale), an event
which led in 1935 to the appointment of Agostino Rocca as chief
executive. For each period, we examine the archival evidence to
determine the key factors related to the development of both scientific management and cost/management accounting and the
links, if any, between them. We then review our findings in the
light of European and American contexts.
CHANGE IN MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
	In the last six years, two special editions devoted to the
theme of management accounting change have appeared in
Management Accounting Research. In the first, editors Burns and
Vaivio [2001, p. 392] pointed out that, “Change is an exciting but
problematic concept, defying definition and structured analysis.”
In the more recent, Busco et al. [2007, p. 125] suggest that, as a
result of the proliferation of studies over recent years, the time
has come for “systematizing the analysis of management accounting change along some key dimensions which can prompt
some further reflection.” In this pursuit, they suggest four dimensions: “the agents and objects of change; the forms and ratio
of change; the space and time of change; and the interplay between change and stability.” Given the rapid development of this
literature, it is not surprising that there is no single, generally
accepted theory of change in management accounting. Indeed,
some authors have queried whether the emphasis should even
be on change. Quattrone and Hopper [2001] suggest that perhaps it ought to be on “drift,” while Granlund [2001, p. 161] is
more concerned with “stability.” Granlund went on to note that
stability and change can co-exist, while “continuity of accounting practices over time is a result of a large number of issues
that take effect on various levels of organizational operations.”
	One framework which can be used to analyze such change
or stability is Kurt Lewin’s theory of change. Although this
theory relates to a planned approach to managing proposed
change, his ideas can be used to understand and interpret, retrospectively, developments that have already occurred. Lewin’s
model comprises three stages – “unfreezing” of the current
equilibrium or status quo, a necessity if people are going to be
Published by eGrove, 2008
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motivated  towards change; “moving” to a new equilibrium by
changing what needs to be changed; and “refreezing,” making
the new equilibrium permanent. Unfreezing is necessary in order to overcome the strains of individual resistance and group
conformity and can be achieved in three ways: (1) increasing the
forces driving change, (2) reducing the forces resisting change,
or (3) some combination of (1) and (2). Moving can also be encouraged in three ways: (1) persuading employees that the current status quo is not beneficial to them and encouraging them
to explore new possibilities; (2) getting them to work together on
a quest for new and relevant information; and (3) connecting the
group view to that of a well-respected, powerful leader or leaders
who support(s) change. Refreezing is vital to successful change.
Without it, there is the strong possibility that there may be a
reversion to the previous status quo. Hence, it is vital that the
new values generated are integrated into the community’s traditions and a balance achieved between the driving forces and the
resisting/restraining forces. If there is such a balance, then the
new position will be an equilibrium since change only occurs
when the strength of one set of forces (either driving change or
resisting it) is greater than that of the other set of forces.
Although Lewin’s theory was advanced in the 1940s, with
many other theories of change developed since (e.g., complexity
theories), it can be argued that it forms the basis of all modern
approaches to change [Burnes, 2004]. Indeed, it has been argued that most theories of change are essentially variations on
Lewin’s basic model. “Scratch any account of creating and managing change and the idea that change is a three-stage process
which necessarily begins with a process of unfreezing will not
be far below the surface” [Hendry, 1996, p. 624]. Lewin’s articulation of a stage model of change is particularly useful for historians since it enables a whole range of potential factors to play a
role. For Busco et al., the key issue that has to be addressed by
scholars is “to locate the agency prompting the whole process”
of management accounting change. Previous authors on the subject have suggested a wide range of possible agencies for change,
from human actors to non-human actants, sometimes placed
within “broader contextual issues, related to certain institutional
pressures, political decisions, economic imperatives, and some
combination of them” [Busco et al., 2007, pp. 129-130].
Although it may not be as all-embracing as social cognitive
theory which recognizes the potential impact of environmental influences, personal factors, and attributes of the behavior
itself, Lewin’s theory does allow for the possible influence of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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key persons or groups; “change agents” in the terminology of
Niehoff. Granlund [2001], for example, emphasized the importance of a key individual, one of the firm’s financial managers, in
producing change at a Finnish food manufacturer. Individuals,
however, can act both as a barrier to change and as a focal point
for change, with the same individual possibly acting as a barrier on one occasion and a focal point on another. Management
accounting change, however, rarely takes place in a vacuum.
As Otley [2001, p. 260] has pointed out, “Accounting systems
are often implicated in the wider processes of organizational
change, providing both a vehicle through which such changes
can be promoted but also a potential rigidity and barrier to
change.” Research in management accounting has suggested
that major developments in organizational structure and accounting systems require motivators, catalysts, and facilitators,
but are often held back by barriers [Innes and Mitchell, 1990;
Cobb et al., 1995], including the attitude of personnel and existing organizational structures and cultures [Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Roberts and Silvester, 1996]. To become established,
new systems of accounting have to secure legitimacy, and they
must develop a workable relationship between the languages of
production and accounting [Scapens and Roberts, 1993]. Such
ideas clearly resonate with the framework suggested by Lewin.
Hence, we adopt his theory as a framework for our discussion
of management accounting developments at Ansaldo during the
study period.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE, 1918-1940
As Nelson [1992, p. 16] has indicated, there were only a few
stirrings of scientific management in Europe before World War
I, with change being uncoordinated and gradual. The war and
its aftermath, however, provided something of a stimulus with
industrialists, unions, and governments in most countries all
coming to view scientific management in a more positive light.
Most noticeably, post-war, pre-Depression Europe was characterized by a new tolerance among workers and union leaders
and by the emergence of associations dedicated to the promotion of scientific management. In many countries, most notably
in Germany [Nelson, 1992, pp. 2, 23-24], this found expression
in the idea of rationalization, a broad social concept aimed at
leading to a “better society.” However, the Great Depression appears to have diminished the attraction of American ideas and
its European surrogate, rationalization.
Published by eGrove, 2008
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	The development of rationalization movements after 1918
was widespread throughout Europe, in countries like the U.K.
still generally committed to laissez-faire economics, in ones like
Germany where the state played a guiding role, and in those
such as Russia with virtually total state control. Italy clearly
was in the last category as the State played a significant role in
economic, political, and social affairs. While the early stages
of Italian industrialization, through 1920, took place in a “politico-industrial setting which left space for political and trade
union liberties and for the development of forms of economic
democracy, … [d]uring the 20 years of fascism [from 1922 to
1943], that liberty and development were sacrificed” [Bonelli,
1994, p. 629]. Fascism was both a bureaucratic and political system, designed not only to control the working classes through
influencing everyday life, but also to reduce foreign competition, thereby sustaining national capitalism [Costa et al., 1978].
Overall, it is commonly agreed that Fascism operated as a strong
institutional mechanism which protected the large national corporations due to the state’s close connections with big financial
interests.
As in other European countries, with the notable exception
of Britain, a national organization dedicated to the promotion of
scientific management was established in Italy in January 1926.
This organization, Ente nazionale italiano per l’organizzazione
scientifica del lavoro (ENIOS), represented the institutionalization of the introduction of scientific management principles. It
was promoted following changes in Mussolini’s cabinet in 1925
and the appointment of the engineer, Professor Giuseppe Belluzzo, as Minister of National Economy. A major supporter of
Taylorism in the interwar period [Fauri, 1999, p. 101], Belluzzo
started a campaign for industrial reorganization which favored
concentration of industry, increasing the size of business units,
and encouraging internal reorganization. In 1926-1927, the
Consiglio Superiore dell’Economia Nazionale (Supreme Council
of National Economy) decided to make instruction in scientific
management compulsory in all technical schools and institutes
in Italy and to “introduce the most modern methods of industrial organization into the chief Government departments and
the State industrial undertakings, by way of setting an example
to the nation as a whole” [Devinat, 1927, p. 85].
Although Belluzzo’s campaign was supported by
L’organizzazione scientifica del lavoro, a review published by
ENIOS which enjoyed widespread circulation with 15,966
subscribers in 1930, mainly in northern Italy, his approach
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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did not find sympathy with northern industrialists. In 1928,
the newspaper, L’informazione industriale, an emanation of
Turin industrialists, wrote that [quoted in Fauri, 1999, p. 102]:
“rationalization … means demolishing our premises and building new ones, changing all our machinery and concentrating
factories producing similar products … even though we are not
in the least financial experts, we can promptly and surely say
no.” Indeed, Sapelli [1978, p. 62] has suggested that within the
“standardization” process of this period, the accent was more on
“unification” of materials and equipment than on “normalization”, i.e., the growth of large-scale mass production.
	Thus, in Italy, as in other countries across Europe, many
industrialists remained skeptical of scientific management during the 1920s despite the existence of national and international
organizations dedicated to its promotion. The rationalization
movement, which was already beginning to falter by the end of
the 1920s, was effectively silenced during the Depression era as
Americanization no longer appeared the path to follow. Some in
Europe were completely disenchanted with the whole scientific
movement. Thus, Ernst Poensgen, iron and steel industrialist
and head of the German Steel Association, stated in exasperation to a colleague in 1931 [quoted in Nolan, 1994, p. 228]:
Don’t mention science to me! We’ve been pumped full
with science: scientific technology, scientific management, scientific market research, scientific accountancy,
and so on and so on. And where has all this science
brought us?
	Despite the problem with rationalization as a broad social
concept, not all industrialists were turned away from every
aspect of scientific management. Many were happy to apply Taylor’s ideas at the shop-floor level, as exemplified by the Europewide success of the Bedaux consultancy in selling its simplified
version of Taylorism to businessmen desperate to cut costs as a
means of ensuring survival [Kipping, 1999]. As Table 1 shows,
the Bedaux consultancy was very successful in both France and
Britain during the 1930s, but less so in Germany where its office
was closed in 1933 following Hitler’s rise to power, although it
was allowed to re-open in 1937 under a different name.
	In Italy in the 1930s, there was a backlash against scientific
management generally and the Bedaux system in particular. As
noted in Table 1, the adoption of the Bedaux system grew much
more slowly in Italy than in any other country between 1931
and 1937. Although attempts to apply the system had been made
Published by eGrove, 2008
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TABLE 1
The International Expansion of the
Bedaux Consultancy during the 1930s
Country

Office opened

United States
1916/18
British Isles
1926
Germany
1927
Italy
1927
1929
France
Source: Kipping [1999, p. 198]

Plants using the Bedaux system
1931
1937
52
500
30
225
5
25
21
49
16
144

since 1927, as in other countries, such attempts had met with
strong resistance from workers. Concerns over wage reductions and intensification of work rhythms led to strike action on
numerous occasions by the Fascist unions despite strikes being
illegal in Italy at the time [Volpato, 1978, pp. 214-216]. Concerns over the nature of piecework agreements made under the
Bedaux system led, on November 9, 1934, to a motion being adopted by the Central Corporation Committee (Comitato Centrale
delle Corporazioni) requiring that every piecework agreement
must have been collectively bargained (contrattazione collettiva).
The passing of this motion has led Lavista [2003] to declare that
Bedauxism (Bedonismo) had been abolished, while Kipping
[1999, p. 200] has claimed that the Bedaux consultancy in Italy
was banned by the State in 1936. The impact of the 1934 motion, however, was that, in early 1935 in those businesses which
operated piecework systems, managements and unions were
forced to renegotiate their agreements [Sapelli, 1978, pp. 235236]. In practice, however, the new bonus-related schemes that
emerged were merely variations of the previous Bedaux arrangements, most particularly because the Bedaux system found general ideological acceptance among Fascist industrialists [Fauri,
1999, p. 104]. Indeed, its emphasis on the human power factor,
ignoring the type of machinery or working methods, meant that
there was no need for any major investment by firms to assess
standard outputs and bonus rates; that is, it was a “ready to use”
system [Musso, 1987, p. 107]. Nevertheless, there were mixed
feelings towards the new systems, varying from enthusiastic imitation to scornful refusal.
	The growing politicization of the debate around scientific
management in Italy in the 1930s, in particular the fact that the
policy of high wages proposed by Taylor was considered politihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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cally unacceptable at this time, was reflected in L’organizzazione
scientifica del lavoro. From 1934 on, the articles published in
ENIOS’s own organ indicate a shift in focus, referring merely to
the introduction of new plant and machinery, the review acting
as more of a marketing showcase for certain companies than
as a device for fostering debate on specific topics. Fauri [1999,
p. 113] also notes that, as in other countries within Europe in
the 1930s, the American model of productivity lost its catalytic
inspiration as autarchy and protectionism prevailed.
SOURCE MATERIALS
	The study of Ansaldo which is conducted in the next two
sections of the paper is based on archival material and published secondary sources. The source of the archival material
is the Ansaldo archive (Archivio Storico Ansaldo, hereafter ASA,
located in Genoa) which was opened in 1980 and contains all of
the surviving records of the company over a period of 150 years.
Over the last 25 years, the Ansaldo archives have been extensively examined by economic and business historians, resulting in
the publication of a number of major studies of various aspects
of the company’s history, particularly works by Rugafiori [1981,
1992], Doria [1989], and Falchero [1990]. Nevertheless, until
now, no management or accounting historian has yet examined
the company’s records for evidence of links between accounting
change and scientific management developments during the interwar period.
Although the survival of cost accounting records for Ansaldo
has not been as great as one might have hoped, it is possible
from those extant and other documentary sources, especially
records deposited by various top managers from the study period, to piece together key aspects of the cost system and how
it changed over time. As with many such historical studies, it is
not always possible to provide precise details of the use made of
the cost information generated. However, the relationship between changes in managerial approach and accounting is clearly
observable from the surviving archival records, supported by
secondary literature.


Bigatti [1998, p. 121] has indicated that the Ansaldo archive, the functions
of which now extend far beyond records maintenance, has become an important
center for Italian business history research.
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ANSALDO: ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT
DEVELOPMENTS, 1918-1933
Overview: World War I saw massive growth at Ansaldo as the
company continued to pursue its policy of vertical integration
which had begun to take shape before hostilities commenced.
Numerous acquisitions resulted in the capital of the company
rising from 30 million lira in 1914 to 500 million in 1918 and
employment growing from 10,432 in 1914 to 47,163 in 1917 (see
Table 2). By the end of the war the company comprised, among
other things, steel foundries and factories, shipbuilding yards,
various mechanical engineering departments, lignite mines in
Tuscany, the Cogne iron ore mines, and an electricity generating
company, Impianti Elettrici Valdostani [Falchero, 1986].
TABLE 2
Key Statistics, Ansaldo during World War I
1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

Stated capital (lira) 30,000,000

30,000,000

45,000,000 100,000,000 500,000,000

Investments (lira)

20,002,444

68,015,772 126,571,621 373,765,510

Employment
Airplane
production (no.)
Airplane engines
production (no.)
Production of steel
(tons)

10,432

19,176

18,322

33,908

47,163

30,397

63

126

768

2,064

203

389

40,275

52,631

26,415

31,341

Source: ASA SSNB 532/7

	The expansion of Ansaldo reflected a twin desire on the
part of the company’s owners, Mario and Pio Perrone, to make
the company less reliant on external suppliers, whether Italian
or foreign, while simultaneously satisfying their thirst for an
industrial, economic, and political power base. This latter desire
was reflected in the Perrone family’s various other activities,
most notably the acquisition of a number of newspapers and the
establishment of the Banca Italiana di Sconto in 1914 [Falchero,
1990; Galli della Loggia, 1970]. With this development, Ansaldo
became one of the major Italian industrial-financial complexes
of the time although remaining heavily reliant on the Italian
State as before World War I.

According to Falchero [1983], Italian nationalism provided the basis for the
establishment of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, its main purpose being to undermine the influence of the “German Bank” (Banca Commerciale) in key sectors of
the Italian economy.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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	Indeed, the war brought Ansaldo even closer to the Italian
State with production, which increased dramatically (see Table
2), becoming increasingly focused on war materials, including airplanes. Not surprisingly, Ansaldo’s turnover and profits
grew during the war, although this would subsequently lead to
accusations of profiteering and consequent legal action by the
State once the war ended [Falchero, 1990]. The ending of hostilities created additional problems for the firm, not the least of
which was a concern over payment for job orders in progress
and how to convert production back to peacetime requirements.
While Ansaldo subsequently received payment for job orders in
progress, the amount was somewhat lower than the value of the
work completed, compounding the problem of falling revenues
consequent upon the economic problems of the immediate postwar years.
	Financial problems coincided with recognition that there
was a major need for investment and restructuring to stem
growing labor costs. During the war, the emphasis within Ansaldo had been on securing production at all costs; little by way
of any rationalization of production processes had occurred.
During 1918-1919, efforts were undertaken in this direction
by the Perrone brothers, but it proved to be too little, too late.
Cash flow problems; a lack of financial support from the Banca
Italiana di Sconto, which itself failed in the early 1920s; the loss
of political support from the Nitti government; legal problems in
respect of war profiteering; and difficulties with the workforce
during the period which became known as the “red biennium,”
pushed Ansaldo into a major crisis. In 1921, Ansaldo recorded
a loss of just over 180 million lira (see Table 3) and found itself
in major financial difficulties. As a result, at the beginning of
1922, the Perrone family was forced out and ownership of the
business passed to a branch of the Bank of Italy. A new company
was formed with capital of 200 million lira, divided between the
Banca Nazionale di Credito, a member of the Credito Italiano
group, one of the most powerful former opponents of the Perrone family, and the former Gio Ansaldo company [Rugafiori,
1978]. In 1925, Banca Nazionale di Credito became the sole
owner of the concern.


 The “red biennium” refers to a period immediately following World War
I when there occurred a large number of strikes among the working classes
throughout Italy. The term “red” is used to reflect the fact that the strikes are
considered to have been inspired by communist ideology.
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TABLE 3
Ansaldo Profits and Losses (in lira), 1919-1940
Year

Profit/(Loss)

Year

Profit/(Loss)

1919
1920

35,590,802
5,947,763

1930
1931

6,664,075
153,177

1921

(180,884,987)

1932

119,045

1922

(331,027,455)

1933

(90,448.622)

1923

3,705,812

1934

1,243,024

1924

4,923,403

1935

(8,980,747)

1925

6,666,612

1936

316,736

1926

(15,958,823)

1937

552,332

1927

(24,981,193)

1938

1,494,869

1928

503,758

1939

9,925,557

1929

6,566,103

1940

14,459,835

Source: Vasta [1998, Table 9, p. 210; 1999, Table 8, p. 268].

	On the change of ownership in 1922, the Perrones’ strategy
of vertical integration was reversed and virtually the entire managerial hierarchy was dismissed. Many factories and plants were
closed or sold, resulting in employment falling to about 10,000
workers in 1922. Under the partial, and subsequently full, control of the bank, Ansaldo’s financial position was stabilized but
remained weak, with the company recording a mixture of small
profits and losses through the 1920s (see Table 3). With the 1929
world slump, there was a further significant reduction in activity at Ansaldo [Degli Esposti, 1993], with employment falling
from 13,400 in 1930 to 9,230 in 1932. The company once again
recorded a major financial loss in 1933.
Organizational Change and Scientific Management to 1933: Before World War I, Ansaldo had suffered from organizational and
managerial problems [Guagnini, 1997], both within its larger
departments and with respect to a lack of coordination between
departments. Directors of the company were sent to visit some
of the most important firms in the engineering and steel sectors, such as Ford, Bethlehem Steel, Krupps, etc., in order to
study new methods of (scientific) management, as yet largely
unknown in Italy. However, with the emphasis of the company’s
production comprising one-off jobs or small batch production,
these methods, more suited to mass production scenarios, failed
to be implemented before the war [ASA, F. Puri 7/13].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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	During World War I, Ansaldo acquired plants located in
Turin formerly operated by Fiat (Ansaldo San Giorgio) where,
prior to the takeover, Fiat personnel had been engaged in the
first experimental applications of Fordist methods in Italy
[Volpato, 1995]. While these methods continued to be applied
after the takeover, and despite being an improvement on the
practices used at Ansaldo’s departments in Genoa, no attempt
was made to apply them to the company’s other factories before
the end of the war [ASA, AP SNB, 128/24]. Nevertheless, a new
system of labor organization involving greater standardization,
the division of productive processes, the employment of nonqualified labor, and the general introduction of piecework
was implemented at Ansaldo during the war [Molinari, 1997].
However, as Dewerpe [1985] has argued, the piecework systems
introduced at this time were ad hoc, the piece rates being determined in a non-scientific manner. Even so, there is evidence
of support for major reorganization among some sections of
the company’s management during 1918-1921, including the
application of Fordism to improve efficiency and reduce pro
duction costs [ASA, AP, SSNB 128/24]. The strength of such support, however, proved insufficient to affect an unfreezing of the
status quo, not the least because the company’s board remained
unconvinced of the potential benefits of the proposed changes.
The Perrone brothers, in particular, took the view that the
company’s diverse range of products, the widespread geographical spread of its factories, the distance from suppliers, and the
fluctuating nature of demand presented obstacles to the application of these new techniques [ASA, AP SSNB 128/24; ASA, F.
Puri, 7/13].
	The forced departure of the Perrones and much of their
top management team in 1922 clearly presented a scenario in
which change could occur since a number of existing barriers
to change were removed. However, little change was effected for
several reasons. First, the managers appointed to replace those
of the former era were largely from a military or political background and had little by way of business skills or knowledge

An example of the chief executive officers during the period following the
Perrone era is Colonel Ugo Cavallero, who was in charge at Ansaldo from 19281933. Born in 1880, he was a captain in the Italian Royal Army during World War
I and chief of the Italian Army delegation at Versailles in 1919. Between 1920
and 1925, having left the army, he managed some Italian firms. From 1925 to
1928, as a close friend of Benito Mussolini, he was appointed Minister of War (the
Italian Army was reorganized under his control), Senator of the Reign, Count, and
Major-General of the Italian Royal Army.
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of new managerial structures and techniques. Second, the key
managerial emphasis for many years after 1922 was merely to
avoid bankruptcy. Third, there was the company’s relationship
with the State, which was a major customer. Under Mussolini,
the nature and power of the Italian State developed greatly and
this, together with the increasing likelihood of the State taking a
major stake in or even control of the company, militated against
the development of a stable and powerful system of governance
within the firm. Commenting on the productive organization of
the company during the war and immediately after, Sarli, manager of Elettrotecnico from 1925, considered the company very
weak and uncoordinated [Gibelli, 1998].
Nevertheless, despite such strong forces militating against
any change, local managerial initiatives can be noted at Ansaldo
during the second half of the 1920s. At the Third International
Congress on Scientific Management, held in Rome in September
1927, for example, Mario Fossati presented a paper entitled,
L’organisation scientifique du travail dans les mines et les usines
electrosiderurgique Ansaldo Cogne Aosta, in which he described
the application of new management techniques inspired by
Taylorism at the Cogne complex of iron ore mines and steel factories where he was director. Although the main focus of the paper is the introduction of new plant and equipment, including a
new railway, new elevators, and electric furnaces, Fossati [1927,
pp. 8-9] reports that significant increases in productivity and
efficiency had been achieved as a result of the managerial and
technical changes implemented. That this was not an isolated
example is made clear by Pellegrini [1929] in his description of
organizational changes inspired by Taylor’s scientific management at the Ansaldo Lorenz telephone factory at Cornigliano
from 1926. Such local initiatives in respect to the utilization of
scientific management within Ansaldo once again emphasize
the possibility of limited change occurring within parts of the
business, but also suggest that the forces acting against change
within the organization as a whole were stronger, resulting in
only a partial unfreezing of existing methods.
A similar occurrence took place in the late 1920s and early
1930s at the company’s electro-technical department where an
attempt was made to implement the Bedaux system. A document dated April 14, 1930, written by the “director/vice-director”
of Elettrotecnico, notes that, “in the electro-technical factory,
by means of a ‘manufacturing time and analysis office,’ we are
strongly pursuing the reduction of labor costs using the Bedaux
method, which we began to adopt experimentally last summer”
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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[ASA FSB 24/26 f.1]. With this development, Ansaldo shows
itself to have been in the forefront of such developments within
Italy, although there is no evidence that the Bedaux system was
introduced more widely within the company at this time. Once
again, this development seems to have represented a partial
unfreezing at a local level which failed to generate permanent
change throughout the organization.
Cost Accounting and Management Control: Throughout the
troubled times from 1918 to the early/mid-1930s, there was one
notable change to the cost system utilized at Ansaldo. At the beginning of the 20th century, the company operated an historical
cost system in which the costs of job orders were linked to the financial accounting system [see, for example, ASA AP SSN 33/1].
Within the cost system, overheads were allocated to departments largely on the basis of pre-determined percentages, partly
reflecting the size of departments as measured by the amount of
capital invested in them. In 1912 [ASA AP SSB 963/17], changes
to the 1904 accounting rules, suggested by Ricci, a member of
Ansaldo’s collegio sindacale, included the charging of a part of
overheads on the basis of direct costs. Further moves were made
in this direction with the issuance of a new set of accounting
rules in 1921 [ASA FSB 27/2].
	Dewerpe [1985] has suggested that budgets were being
used at Ansaldo by 1914, but he seems to have been referring to
statements drawn up monthly by each production department
entitled, “Estimates of purchased materials, planned and actual
expenses and invoices” [ASA AP SSR 559/1]. The basis on which
these statements were drawn up is far from clear, but taken together with the large variances shown when aggregated for all
departments and the lack of explanation for such variances (see
Table 4) suggests that they did not constitute a serious attempt
at budgeting. However, other surviving documents, particularly
the monthly “Preventivi di spesa” (budgeted expenses) for various periods up to 1935, do provide comparisons of planned and
actual expenditure [see, e.g., ASA AP SSR 558/2].


Molinari [1999] incorrectly puts the first application of the Bedaux system
as occurring at Ansaldo in 1940.

At that time, the collegio sindacale comprised, with the board and the general
meeting of the shareholders, one of three main organs within Italian companies.
The collegio sindacale was responsible for ensuring that directors complied with
legal requirements and that the bookkeeping was correct.
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TABLE 4
Variances between Actual and Planned Expenses, July 1916
Planned expenses for all departments
Actual expenses
Variance

L. 9,287,015.50
L. 15,380,131.26
L. 6,093,115.76

Source: ASA AP SSR 559/1.

	Limited knowledge of cost systems at other Italian companies during the early decades of the 20th century makes it difficult to judge whether the one utilized at Ansaldo was advanced
or not. There were limitations as recognized by Pio Perrone in
a letter written to the directors on January 31, 1920: “in our
company we are really far from knowing exactly the cost of our
products in all their constituent elements” [ASA AP SSN 778/5].
A major deficiency of the Ansaldo cost system stemmed from
the manner in which overheads were allocated. The allocation
method utilized coefficients which failed to reflect the effective
absorption of overheads [ASA AP SSN 513], the use of appropriate cost drivers being lacking. Furthermore, price setting was
conducted merely on the basis of adding various percentages to
direct costs to represent general expenses and “profit,” a system
which failed to reflect how production levels interfaced with
costs.
	Such concerns were clearly influenced by the perilous
state of the company’s financial position at the end of World
War I. Thus, in 1919, the Perrone brothers established a General Inspectorate at Ansaldo in an attempt to increase efficiency.
Accounting was part of the remit of the administrative arm of
the Inspectorate, while among the duties of the technical arm
were cost prevention, distribution of work, and the scientific
organization of production. Although the General Inspectorate
was disbanded in 1921, it did establish a new set of accounting
rules. These differed from the earlier rules of 1904, modified in
1912, in an attempt to classify costs using cost drivers linked to
the volume of productive activity.
	The specific purpose behind this change was the attempt
“to know the minimum price at which to accept orders at a
loss ... when orders are not sufficient to absorb all the productive capacity” [ASAFSB27/2, March 1921, f.6], a clear recognition of the importance of direct costs in determining whether
to produce or not. A second important and novel feature of the
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1921 rules was the classification of costs on three levels [ASA
FSB27/2, ff. 4-5]:
1. overheads tout court (spese generali)
2. manufacturing costs (spese di lavorazione)
2.1 direct manufacturing costs (spese di lavorazione)
2.2 shop-floor overheads (spese d’officina)
The manufacturing costs were considered to be those costs
which could be decreased in the case of a reduction of production. Direct manufacturing costs were those costs specifically allocated to job orders (generally, labor and raw materials).
Shop-floor overheads, which were considered not to be “directly
allocable to job orders,” were to “be debited to transitory accounts for statistical purposes, and then allocated to job orders,
by means of hourly rates, actual or theoretical, or by means of
other criteria, according to the situation; such criteria being
established by the technical office, with the agreement of the
administrative office” [ASAFSB27/2, f.5]. The second part of the
1921 rules comprises a list of the “overhead tout court accounts”
and a list of the shop-floor overhead accounts.
	Thus, while the Perrones may have acted as a barrier to the
implementation of certain managerial changes within Ansaldo
after World War I, in particular the introduction of Fordist
methods, they did oversee the implementation of important
changes in cost accounting. The increased emphasis on efficiency enshrined in the new accounting rules was to be a legacy which the Perrones were to leave for their successors upon
which they were able to build. The unfreezing and change introduced by the Perrones became re-frozen by successive managements throughout the 1920s. Thus, from 1925, the production
units were required to send reports to the central management
on the “fundamental indexes of production and the economic
trend of the production units.” Basic indicators contained in
these reports were total cost of manufacturing labor, which
was considered an index of manufacturing intensity [ASA FSB
24/52]; job-order portfolio; monthly expenses for personnel and
auxiliary manpower; the ratios between total general expenses
and the total labor costs, both direct and auxiliary, considered
as indicators of the use of productive capacity; profit or loss on
completed job orders, with an explanation given for each loss;

 The ideas underlying these developments clearly stemmed from the work of
A.H. Church. According to Fasce [1993], the only translation of his book, Production Factors in Cost Accounting and Works Management into Italian (as I fattori
della produzione), was carried out by the General Inspectorate of Ansaldo.
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and the value of cash inflows and outflows.
	Cost control in the 1920s therefore seems to have been
directed towards efficiency, the emphasis oriented towards
controlling and reducing the cost of direct factors. Following
the experimental adoption of the Bedaux method in 1929, the
exploitation of productive capacity was analyzed by means of
a single indirect indicator, i.e., the ratio between the theoretical
and actual working hours. While there is evidence of the introduction at this time of responsibility accounting, it was of
an extremely limited kind, effected only at the level of departments and departmental directors, not within the departments
themselves. Cost determination thus remained centered on the
productive units with no reference to the analysis of individual
or group performance, while variance analysis of budgeted
expenses continued to be carried on in the same way as before
[e.g., ASA FSB 24/24, ASA FSB 24/17].
ANSALDO: ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT
DEVELOPMENTS, 1933-1940
Overview: During the 1920s and early 1930s, Ansaldo had suffered from weak market forces, the Wall Street crash, the inadequacy of its organizational and productive structures, and the
interference of politicians [Rugafiori, 1978]. As a result, in 1933,
a year in which the company exhibited a major loss of almost
100 milllion lira after years of negligible profits (see Table 3),
Ansaldo found itself one of the first companies to be taken under the wing of the State’s new industrial holding arm, the IRI.
Founded in 1933 by the technocrat Alberto Beneduce, the IRI
took over the industrial securities held by those “mixed banks,”
such as the Banca Commerciale Italiana and Credito Italiano,
which had fallen into a deep financial crisis [Amatori and Bigatti, 2003, p. 224]. Beneduce designed a structure in which
firms under State ownership operated in a market environment
rather than as a nationalized monopoly. Initially designed as a
temporary measure, the IRI was declared a permanent institution in 1937 [Ciocca and Toniolo, 1994, p. 585]. The IRI takeover
of Ansaldo guaranteed the survival of the firm, which became
a central plank in the rearmament policy of the Fascist government. Indeed, in 1936, the Italian State accounted for 85% of
Ansaldo’s turnover [Rugafiori, 1999, p. 89].
The IRI, Agostino Rocca, and the Implementation of Scientific
Management: On July 7, 1933, Mario Barenghi, formerly president of Ansaldo, became its chief executive officer (CEO) but, in
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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1935, he was replaced by Agostino Rocca. With a military and
engineering background, Rocca had gained business experience during the 1920s and early 1930s through his close links
with Banca Commerciale Italiana,10 one of the most important
“mixed banks” of the time. After joining the Fascist party in
1923, Rocca became increasingly interested in scientific management11 and a member of ENIOS in 1929. He became closely
associated with the IRI upon its formation and was appointed in
1933 the general manager of Dalmine, an iron company where
he had been employed as an engineer in August 1922. In 1935,
he became general manager not only of Ansaldo but also of
Siac. From 1938 to 1940, Rocca was also general manager of
Finsider, the organization which controlled the iron industry
holdings of the IRI.
When Rocca took over the reins at Ansaldo in 1935, the
business was in a poor shape. Profits were non-existent, the
plant and machinery were outdated, the organizational structure was old-fashioned and confused, enterprise was lacking,
and the implementation of modern managerial techniques had
long been delayed. There was little coordination between the
various parts of the business. Production remained artisanbased with the engineer as the “shop-floor hero,” solving dayto-day problems as they arose. In order to effect the changes
in organizational structure and culture which he saw as necessary, Rocca had to remove as many of the existing barriers
to such change as possible while simultaneously enhancing

 Rocca attended a military high school and the Reale Accademia di Torino. After serving as an officer in the Italian Army from May 1915 to December
1919, he graduated from the Politecnico di Milano, as an electrical/industrial
engineer in May 1921.
10
 Links with Banca Commerciale Italiana began in 1921 when Rocca
married Maria Queirazza, daughter of one of the bank’s managers. In 1926,
Giuseppe Toeplitz, general manager of the Banca Commerciale, appointed
Rocca as administrative inspector of many important Italian companies, such
as Mira Lanza, a factory producing detergents, where he supposedly implemented a cost accounting system based on those used in the U.S. [Rugafiori,
1999, p. 81]. Details of this system are unfortunately unknown. In 1929, Rocca
became an employee of the technical-industrial office of the Banca Commerciale where he worked as an inspector and/or consultant for the companies
controlled by the bank. From 1930, he participated in Sofinid, an operation established by the Banca Commerciale in that year to oversee the bank’s portfolio of industrial companies, which included important concerns such as Terni,
Sip, and Italgas. Sofinid attempted to sell off parts of the portfolio to other
investors [Rugafiori, 1984].
11
 In the early 1920s, Rocca undertook various journeys throughout Europe and the U.S. during which he learned about scientific management.
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the forces driving change. Thus, in an attempt to apply managerial ideas and concepts with which he was familiar, Rocca
introduced managers from other firms, firing many foremen
he identified as a barrier to the implementation of new ideas.
Nevertheless, despite the support of these new managers and
Ansaldo’s position of power within a stable governance system
(IRI as the sole shareholder and Fascism firmly established),
Rocca faced stiff resistance to the implementation of new ideas
at all levels within the company.
	Following an in-depth analysis of the business, Rocca
embarked on a program of restructuring and rationalization
focused around a functionally based organizational structure
in an attempt to generate major efficiency gains at the factories
[ASA F.SB 3/7c]. One of the first developments and one which
was to play an important role in these early changes was the
creation in August 1935 of the Organizzazione nuovi impianti,
the central office for the organization of new plants (ONI). Under Enrico Vandone, one of the most active members of ENIOS
who had been brought by Rocca from Fiat, ONI was charged
with establishing a new organizational structure. In particular,
ONI promoted studies and elaborated programs incorporating
Taylorist methods. While these helped to improve efficiency, they
also served to increase the bureaucratic structure of the company’s organization and its information needs [ASA F.SB 25/48].
Furthermore, Vandone’s methods did not meet with universal
approval as they were considered too complex and bureaucratic.
Opposition from managers hostile to the application of scientific
management principles first forced him to be moved from the
ONI to the position of director of the mechanical department
and ultimately in 1940 to be fired for excessive authoritarianism
[Molinari, 1999].
	It was under the auspices of ONI that the first systematic
attempt was made to introduce piecework systems throughout
Ansaldo. Thus, a document dated October 15, 1937 notes a continuing concern within Ansaldo over the organization of labor
on the shop-floor, together with resistance to new systems from
within the ranks of management [ASA FSB 24/46]. In it, Sarli
[ASA FSB 24/46], the director of the elettrotecnico department,
refers to “systems of technical-bureaucratic elaboration and the
preparation of manufactures”:
these systems are constituted by a complex of specific
‘modules’ – whose conformation (which should be as
appropriate as possible) has a very big influence on the
validity of the systems – and related compilation rules.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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These systems are something which cannot be – and
which have never been – created suddenly by someone
but which have to be the result of an evolution coming
from the experience of a specific department over the
years. … Substituting, within a specific department, a
new system to the one currently in use is like trying to
substitute, within a population, the existing language
with a new, rationally created one… It has to be noted
that the nature of production (in particular mass- and
non-mass production) has a great influence on the
nature of the system. … We classify: SYSTEM A, the
system which was in use in these departments until 18
months ago; SYSTEM B, the system introduced by ONI
18 months ago and gradually applied; SYSTEM C, the
system we wish to propose as definitive.
Sarli was highly critical of system B, noting that under it, the
technical staff, despite an increase in number from 35 to 57,
had been unable to perform the functions that it had carried out
18 months before with fewer personnel. This, together with the
increased difficulty in organizing production programs, led Sarli
to advocate a move to the new arrangement, system C.12
	In 1939, Rocca decided to move from a centralized, functional structure for the company to a divisional organization
with each manufacturing department controlling its own marketing, production, and capital budgeting. Planning, however,
remained a centralized function with managerial control partially implemented through target setting, budgeted expenses,
and the allocation of investment funds, although we have found
no evidence of the use of ROI at Ansaldo at this time. The new
organizational structure was set out in Rocca’s CIRCOLARE
A.D. N. 66 [ASA FSB 3/7], dated January 5, 1940, and the accompanying organizational chart [ASA FSB 3/7C]. At the top of
the managerial hierarchy was to be a general director; a directors’ committee comprising the CEO (Rocca), the general director, and all departmental directors; and a departmental committee, comprising the general director and the managers of each
department. The management of the departments was under the
charge of the directors, while central management was in charge
of inspection, administration, and other staffing functions, such
as the building and plant repair section, the operations management section, the commercial section, the administrative section, the personnel section, and the general secretary’s office.
 Unfortunately, precise details of the various systems are not provided.

12
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The Development of Management Accounting during the Rocca
Period: Although an engineer, Rocca had a clear understanding
of both financial and management accounting, which he had
developed abroad [Rugafiori, 1984; Lussana, 1996]. When appointed general manager, he made a first attempt at implementing scientific management techniques across the business and
instituted a responsibility accounting system [ASA D. SB 3/7
C]. Initially, while the business was organized on a functional
basis, direct (productive) and indirect (non-productive and auxiliary) cost centers were created. Cost accounting was conducted
within each production unit by a separate COI (cost accounting)
office responsible for recording materials, purchase and sales
invoices, and cost accounting. The various COI offices were coordinated by the Direzione servizi amministrativi (management
administration service).
	During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Rocca established
many accounting and costing norms which not only influenced the method adopted but reflected changes in the
managerial structure of the business. On the more technical
accounting side, Norm 62000 of January 16, 1936, for example,
stated that the closing cost balances were to be debited only
with direct costs (material, direct labor, and expenses). All other
cost elements were to be considered indirect and part of general
expenses which, for each department, were to be allocated on
the basis of direct labor, the percentage being calculated for
each department using established rules. Only auxiliary services
(e.g., power, water, steam, transportation, etc.) were to be allocated on the basis of consumption, actual or theoretical [Avallone, 2002]. Norm 000631, dated October 11, 1938, classified
direct labor as the cost for the laborers who manufactured the
product, while auxiliary labor comprised the cost for services,
such as repairing, building equipment, plant transformation, etc. Together, direct and auxiliary labor were considered
productive labor, while unproductive labor, such as cleaning,
foremen, machine preparers, etc., was not directly related to
production. Norm 640000 of July 3, 1936, meanwhile, demonstrates the links between cost and financial accounting at
Ansaldo. Inventories were determined in the same way by the
COI for all productive units and credited to account COI/10
(inventory) and debited to COI/30 (direct job order expenses).
	Under Rocca’s various norms, responsibility for the planning, production scheduling, and overhead cost control was
divided between headquarters staff and the various COI. An
internal audit office was established in July 1937. Industrial
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accounting remained within the productive units. Norm 63003
of October 1939 defined the basic duties of each COI office
as the bookkeeping for and the control of (1) the movement
of material, (2) direct costs, (3) labor cost, (4) overheads for
every cost pool, (5) product cost, and (6) monthly data for
financial accounting purposes. Each COI was also required
to provide the general and departmental management with
reports through which they could control activities. Such
reports covered the expenses of individual departments, offices, and services, and the cost of each product. Further, they
should offer judgments regarding actual and estimated figures.
Under CIRCOLARE A.D. N. 66 [ASA FSB 3/7], dated January
5, 1940, industrial accounting remained the responsibility of
departments subject to checking, audit, and approval by the
company’s central management.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
	Conditions within most Italian firms during the 1920s
were not especially conducive to the implementation of scientific management. Despite the formation of ENIOS in 1926,
many elements of Taylorism were either anathema to Italian
industrialists or impossible to implement in Italian firms due
to political and socio-cultural factors which influenced the
customs and traditions that pervaded Italian industry. Not the
least of these was the rise of Fascism immediately after a long
period of social hardship, class struggles, and strong reaction by
entrepreneurs to the problems resulting from the labor troubles
of the “red biennium.” Another contributing factor was the
lack of managerialism in Italian businesses, partly reflecting a
high concentration of family ownership. The lack of a strong,
dynamic engineering profession or an entrepreneurial culture,
as well as heavy reliance on the State by firms, meant that scientific management innovations lacked the fertile soil within Italy
in which to establish themselves between the wars. Nevertheless, companies such as Fiat, Magneti Marelli, Cantiere Navale
Triestino, Officine Meccaniche di Novara, Olivetti, Manifatture
Cotoniere Meridionali, Manifattura pellami e calzature, Perugina, and Cirio did begin to adopt some scientific management
practices in the 1920s and early 1930s [Volpato, 1978, pp. 192193]. Our case study firm, Ansaldo, a leading player in the iron
and steel, engineering, and shipbuilding sectors in Italy in the
early decades of the 20th century, also shows evidence of piecemeal experimentation with scientific management before 1930,
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antecedent to embracing it more whole-heartedly in the second
half of the 1930s.
	Events such as the implementation of Taylorite techniques
at the Cogne iron mines about 1927 and the Bedaux system at
the electro-technical factory in 1929/1930, however, represented
simply local management initiatives that did not spread more
widely. Widespread adoption of scientific management only occurred when an individual in a key management position, Rocca
as chief executive, was convinced of the potential benefits. Even
so, the changes introduced by Rocca represented the implementation of a narrow version of scientific management, focusing
on the rationalization of production techniques and procedures.
In this, however, Ansaldo was little different from many companies throughout the world in both Europe and America [Hoxie,
1920], which often selected only those parts of Taylorism which
they thought useful while rejecting or pushing aside other, less
palatable, more contentious, or potentially more disruptive aspects [see, Smith and Boyns, 2005 on Britain].
	To be successful in this narrow implementation, however, Rocca had to address the problem of significant barriers to
change enshrined with the existing organizational structure of
the company and the incumbent management culture. Deliberate steps were taken to reduce the barriers to change (e.g., existing foremen), while simultaneously enhancing the driving forces
for change (e.g., bringing in outside managers well-versed in the
ideas of scientific management). Despite this, the process was by
no means a smooth one. Vandone, for example, was brought in
as an important driver of change, but his methods on occasion
served only to reinforce resistance, resulting in his removal from
the center of events and eventual dismissal from the company
altogether. Nevertheless, the organization which spearheaded
the implementation of the new methods and which he had
helped establish, the ONI, continued to be an important driving
force even after his removal.
While aspects of scientific management were gradually adopted at Ansaldo throughout the interwar period, there is also
evidence of changes in cost accounting identified in two periods
– 1919-1922 and post-1935. In the first, a key role was played
by the owners of the business, the Perrone brothers. Although
the Perrones acted as a barrier to the introduction of Fordist
methods at Ansaldo immediately after World War I, despite
their knowledge of and interest in scientific management, they
did represent a positive force in respect to cost accounting developments. The company’s worsening financial plight in 1919
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
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fueled a growing concern with efficiency, leading the Perrones
to establish the General Inspectorate which introduced new
costing rules in 1921 that focused on direct costs. Although the
Perrones lost control of the company in 1922, the changes they
set in motion proved beneficial to the firm’s management during the 1920s. In the post-Perrone era, successive managements
utilized costs for purposes of managerial control, contrary to the
view of Benjamin Barabato et al. [1996] who have expressed the
view that the lack of competition and closeness of many large
businesses to the State militated against the use of costs for purposes of managerial control and efficiency in Italy between the
wars.
	The second significant episode of change in cost accounting, including the adoption of elements of responsibility accounting, coincided with the more widespread development of
scientific management following the appointment of Rocca as
chief executive. The clear link between these two developments
from 1935 onwards supports the idea put forward by Boyns
and Edwards [1997] that changes in cost/management accounting often occur as part of a symbiotic process of change within
organizational structures and management systems rather than
as part of a causal mechanism, as suggested by Chandler [1977,
1990] and Johnson and Kaplan [1987]. Perhaps it was the failure
to implement scientific management in its widest sense which
explains the lack of development of the Chandlerian M-form
structure and the failure to adopt accounting techniques associated therewith, especially budgeting and standard costing. But,
once again, in this respect during the interwar period, Ansaldo
was no different from companies such as the Sperry Corporation in the U.S. [Fleischman and Marquette, 2003], Thyssens in
Germany [Fear, 2005], Renault and Berliet in France [Moutet,
1992; Zimnovitch, 1997; Berland, 1999], or many firms in the
British chemical and iron and steel industries [Edwards et al.,
2002; Boyns et al., 2004].
	If Ansaldo was not different from many other companies
across the industrialized world, what lessons can we learn from
it in relation to the issue of identifying the key factors which
influence change in organizational structures and cost/management accounting? According to Lewin’s theory, change can
only occur when the forces promoting change outweigh those
resisting it. This study has found that the balance of forces for
and against change can ebb and flow over time, and that it is
not necessarily the case that all changes will become permanent
or widespread throughout an organization. While both internal
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and external factors have been found significant in influencing
change, the Ansaldo case emphasizes the importance of key
individuals in effecting permanent change, especially in the area
of cost accounting, therefore supporting the work of Granlund
[2001]. From the perspective of Busco et al. [2007], the Perrones
played an important role during the 1919-1921 period, while
Rocca represented the key agency through which management
accounting change was effected in the late 1930s. Both the Perrones and Rocca, however, carried out this role within a broader
context, comprising a combination of institutional pressures,
reflecting the socio-political and economic influences of the
time. This study suggests that while accounting historians need
to understand the contextualizing forces surrounding change, it
might be more useful to focus more closely on the role of individuals in overcoming resistance to change and, thus, enabling it
to take place.
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